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Abstract—There has recently been a flood of interest in
potential new applications of blockchains, as well as proposals
for more generic designs called public ledgers. Most of the
novel proposals have been in the financial sector. However,
the public ledger is an abstraction that solves several of the
fundamental problems in the design of secure distributed sys-
tems: global time in the form of a strict linear order of past
events, globally consistent and immutable view of the history,
and enforcement of some application-specific safety properties.
This paper investigates the applications of public ledgers to
access control and, more specifically, to group management in
distributed systems where entities are represented by their public
keys and authorization is encoded into signed certificates. It
is particularly difficult to handle negative information, such as
revocation of certificates or group membership, in the distributed
setting. The linear order of events and global consistency simplify
these problems, but the enforcement of internal constraints in the
ledger implementation often presents problems. We show that
different types of revocation require slightly different properties
from the ledger. We compare the requirements with Bitcoin, the
best known blockchain, and describe an efficient ledger design for
membership revocation that combines ideas from blockchains and
from web-PKI monitoring. While we use certificate-based group-
membership management as the case study, the same ideas can be
applied more widely to rights revocation in distributed systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchains and similar public log structures provide a
new way to publish information and achieve consistency in
a distributed system. The goal of this paper is to apply these
ideas to distributed access control and, in particular, to the
propagation of negative information such as revocations. We
use group membership management with certificates as the
main case study.
Bitcoin [20] was created as a new distributed currency
that would challenge the current monetary system, and it
soon received various competitors. The cryptocurrencies are,
however, increasingly recognized for their broader contribution
to the design of distributed systems. They combine several
previously theoretical ideas to a new way of building a secure
distributed system. Transactions take place between public
keys and, thus, can be communicated as signed messages. The
problem of global consistency is solved by compressing the
global history of transactions into a public log structure called
blockchain and, finally, into one cryptographic hash value,
which can relatively easily be agreed on and communicated
to everyone. Inclusion and fairness are guaranteed by an open
peer-to-peer (P2P) network, a competitive mining process, and
monetary incentives in the form of transaction fees. Moreover,
double-spending prevention, which is a global constraint on
the permissible transactions, is enforced by the P2P network.
Bitcoin challenged some fundamental ideas about what is fea-
sible in a global distributed system. First, all local transactions
are communicated throughout the global network and they
are available for anyone to download. Second, the transaction
data is not encrypted or fully anonymous. Previously, such
compromises of performance and privacy would have been
thought unrealistic, or outrageous. It is interesting to ask what
distributed systems will look like if we accept the compromises
made in Bitcoin and attempt to use them for other purposes
than a monetary system.
Recently, many new applications have been proposed
that build on (or leech from) the Bitcoin P2P network and
blockchain (e.g. Colored Coins, Mastercoin, Factom, Proof
of Existence, Tierion), and ones that propose constructing
their own blockchain (e.g. Ethereum, Namecoin). The overall
observation in these schemes is that the blockchain has many
uses beyond cryptocurrency implementation. Some sources use
the generic term public ledger, which stores information about
transactions, instead of blockchain, in order to avoid making
a reference to the specific cryptographic implementation. De-
pending on the context, it may be easier to think of a public
log of events instead. We use this terminology interchangeably.
Access control in distributed systems is known to be a
difficult problem. The lack of consistency that arises from
parallelism and asynchronous communication may create race
conditions [3] that can be exploited by a malicious party.
In particular, it is difficult in a distributed setting to com-
municate reliably negative information, such as revocation of
access rights, or to verify the non-existence of credentials
or revocation. A key observation that motivates our work is
that the double-spending prevention in Bitcoin is also a kind
of negative permission: once the money has been spent, it
cannot be spent again. Thus, we ask the following question:
Can public ledgers be used to enforce secure membership
revocation and other flavors of negative permissions in a
distributed setting, and can it be done efficiently?
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The focus of this paper is on distributed group membership
management in a key-oriented system, where entities are rep-
resented by cryptographic key pairs and group membership is
granted with signed certificates. We use group membership as
the main case study partly because it provides more complex
and challenging revocation scenarios than most access-control
systems. The work was additionally motivated by the prac-
tical need for a group-based access control mechanism in a
credential-sharing service.
This paper makes the following contributions: We show
how the public ledger, as an abstraction, can be used to solve
a central problem of distributed access control, the consistent
distribution of revocation information. We use certificate-based
group membership management as the case study and analyze
its problems thoroughly. As our main technical contribution,
we present a ledger design that solves these problems. To
demonstrate the feasibility and efficiency of the solution,
we implemented a prototype of certificate-based group mem-
bership management that supports membership revocation.
The solution makes use of data structures from the security
literature, which have previously been used for auditing the
web PKI. We analyze the suitability of the Bitcoin blockchain
for the same tasks and point out several limitations in it.
More generally, we hope to increase understanding of the
opportunities that the public ledgers offer for the design of
secure distributed systems.
II. BACKGROUND
This section introduces concepts and related literature from
blockchains and distributed access control, as well as related
solutions for web PKI monitoring.
A. Bitcoin, blockchain and public ledger
Bitcoin [20] was designed as a cryptocurrency, but it has
found several other uses. It is widely used as a timestamping
service (e.g. CommitCoin [7], Factom, Proof of Existence,
Tierion). Documents and other messages can be notarized by
publishing a hash of the data in a Bitcoin transaction, which
can later be used to prove that the document existed at a
specific time. Other applications of the blockchain technology
include the Internet name service (Namecoin) and anonymous
credentials [10]. Recently, there has been a rush to propose
new financial applications from land registry to diamond
trade and from energy markets to tax audits [26]. Many of
these applications build on the concept of smart contracts
(e.g. Ethereum [28]). These are financial contracts enforced
in deterministic program code that can be executed by anyone
independently to verify the outcome. Seeing the potential of
the blockchain technology, mainstream organizations like The
Linux Foundation and Microsoft are trying to advance it by
developing open-source blockchain platforms1,2. Somewhat
closer to the goals of this paper is the use of the Bitcoin
blockchain as a PGP key server, which includes the publication
of revocations [27].
The success of Bitcoin and blockchain technology is due
to the availability and consistency of its data. The blockchain
contains the entire global history of transactions that have
1https://www.hyperledger.org/
2https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/bletchley-blockchain/
been created since the beginning and is publicly accessible
by everyone. Moreover, since each block contains a reference
to the previous block and requires a proof-of-work which is
computationally expensive to produce, it is impractical for
individuals to modify a block once it has been included
in the blockchain. These properties protect the system from
double spending (i.e. spending more money that one has)
and modification of previous transaction records. However,
the nature of the blockchain makes it an inefficient structure
for data retrieval. Without additional indexes or summaries of
transactions, looking for a specific transaction would involve
going through all the blocks in the chain.
B. Distributed access control
In distributed access control, access rights are granted to
subjects in the form of cryptographically protected credentials.
They are similar to the capabilities in the capability list [15]
of centralized access control, but instead of being stored with
a central entity, they are distributed to clients. The credentials
can be created with either secret-key [6], [11] or public-key
mechanisms [4], [5], [8]. Our focus is on key-oriented systems,
which are not entirely dissimilar from the cryptocurrencies.
In them, entities are represented by their public keys and
the access credentials are in the form of signed authorization
certificates. The key-oriented PKIs were an active research
topic in the late 90s as an alternative to the X.509 name
certificates. While the proposed new certificate formats have
not been standardized, they have been influential in the un-
derstanding of distributed access control and its limitations.
The central ideas were coined, for example, in SPKI/SDSI
[8], [9], [21], which encodes not only access rights but also
name spaces and group membership with certificates. However,
while we present our results in terms of signed certificates, the
observations of this paper about revocation with public ledgers
can be generalized to other types of distributed access-right and
group management.
Unlike traditional certificates such as X.509 [12], which
bind keys to names, the authorization certificates bind the keys
directly to attributes or access rights. The basic format of an
authorization certificate is the following:
C = 〈PK issuer ,PK subject , auth, validity ,Sig issuer 〉 (1)
The certificate is signed by the issuer, who gives to the
subject an authorization, i.e. access rights that are often related
to a specific object, for a validity period. The issuer and
subject are identified directly by their public keys. With these
certificates, an entity can delegate some of its authority to
another. As a result, the certificates may form a chain or even
a complicated network that reflects the underlying relations
between their issuers and subjects. When a subject requests
access to a resource, it sends a certificate chain to the verifier.
The verifier then determines whether the subject is permitted to
perform the requested access operation by recursively verifying
each certificate in the chain.
Revocation. Revocation is a fundamental operation in access
control, and it is usually communicated with signed messages,
which are similar to certificates but convey negative infor-
mation. In the key-oriented PKIs, the effect of revocation is
2
to invalidate one certificate, which also makes invalid all the
certificate chains in which it has been included.
The problem of revoking authorization certificates is that
the subject can choose which information to present to the
verifier when making an access request, and nothing prevents
it from excluding the negative information that would cause
it to be denied access. Therefore, the verifier should have
some independent means to verify the non-existence of negative
information. In Section IV, we will apply a public ledger to
solving this dilemma.
As will become apparent from the examples of Section V,
group management may require another type of revocation
where only group leaders can add or expel members from
groups, and where members added by a previous group leader
should remain valid even when the leader is revoked.
C. Public logs for monitoring the web PKI
The widely publicized compromises of certifiers, such as
Comodo and DigiNotar, have motivated quite a few recent
proposals for monitoring the security of the web PKI with the
help of public log servers.
Certificate Transparency (CT) [17] by Laurie et al. suggests
public logs of all web certificates to bring transparency to the
CA operations. Web clients should accept certificates only after
checking that they are in the log. It is expected that, with the
log, clients and special auditors can detect suspicious behavior,
such as multiple certificates issued to the same name. The log
is structured as an append-only Merkle hash tree, in which new
records are added to the right of the tree. The specification
does not take a firm stand on who will maintain the log. In
a follow-up blog post [16], the authors suggested a sparse
Merkle tree for storing revocations, which enables constant-
size (but relatively large) proofs of existence and non-existence
for the revocations. They also hinted about separate trees for
the time and lexicographic order. Ryan [22] took these ideas
further but replaced the sparse tree with a shallower hash tree,
where certificates sorted by the subject name are stored in the
in-ordered tree nodes. Again, the ordering allows logarithmic-
size proofs of existence and non-existence for certificates.
Ryan also points out the importance of auditing consistency
between the two trees.
In the Accountable Key Infrastructure (AKI) [13], certifi-
cates are registered in an integrity log server (ILS). It maintains
an ordered Merkle tree, where the data in the leaf nodes is
sorted by the domain name, thus enabling compact proofs of
existence and non-existence. Independent validators audit the
ILS by maintaining a copy of the log tree. The web clients
compare the root hash of the ILS with those of the validators.
Revoked certificates are removed from the tree, so that it
always stores the current status. The trees form a hash chain
to enable auditing of the history, which is not very different
from blockchains. ARPKI [2] is a redesign of AKI which
provides more prudent security guarantees by combining mul-
tiple X.509 certificates from different CAs to one certificate,
and by establishing quorum among a fixed group of n global
ILSs. PoliCert [25] is another similar solution with focus on
domain-specific certification policies. In PoliCert, one Merkle
tree contains both the certificates and revocation information,
ordered by a hash of the certificate H(C). In yet another
variant of these ideas, PKI Safety Net [24] enables verification
of both the issuing time order and the non-existence of records
for a domain by maintaining two trees that are similar to those
in CT and AKI, respectively. Independent monitors maintain a
copy of the trees and audit their consistency. Unlike the earlier
proposals, PKI Safety Net also considers certificate chains
explicitly and allows revocation of intermediate CAs. CONIKS
[18] uses a Merkle prefix tree to construct directories of user
certificates. This also enables efficient proofs of existence and
non-existence. Each leaf of the tree stores records that are
mapped to the index represented by the path from it to the
root.
One lesson from these papers is that it is sufficient for one
entity to maintain the public log if there are others who audit
its actions. Ryan [29] points out, though, that such authorities
should not be allowed to form an oligopoly. Most of the
proposals (with the exception of [22] and [18]) are focused
on X.509 name certificates for the web PKI or users. In this
paper, we consider the use of public logs in the wider scope
of key-oriented PKIs and in distributed group management.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF A PUBLIC LEDGER
In this section, we will discuss the properties of a public
ledger. Although well known, it is worth stating them clearly.
The goal is to lift the discussion from the level of cryptographic
mechanisms to abstract characteristics, and to present a list
of orthogonal features (although some interdependency cannot
be avoided) from which ledger implementers and application
designers can choose. In the later sections, we will observe the
significance of these characteristic in distributed access control.
Immutability. The ledgers are append-only, i.e. monotonically
growing collections of transactions, or close approximations
of such. It must not be possible to edit the already entered
information or to roll back the ledger to an earlier state.
In practical implementations, there may be a windows of
uncertainty before the contents stabilize, and it may be possible
to clean out entries that are no longer relevant.
Global consistency. The most prominent property of the
public ledgers is consistency of the ledger contents. That is,
different parties retrieving information from the ledger will not
receive conflicting information. Together with the immutability
property, this means that different parties have the same view
of the current state and history of the ledger contents, and these
views never diverge.
Consistency is a widely studied issue in distributed sys-
tems, typically in relation to distributed databases and quo-
rum protocols. Many different variants of the property have
been defined, and there has been controversy about where
blockchains fit among them. We do not intend to take a
stand here, but rather note that there may be subtle differ-
ences between the kinds of consistency offered by different
implementations of the public ledger, and we should remain
observant about them.
Inclusiveness. Another necessary property of the public ledger
is that it eventually accepts all entries sent to it, except those
that violate defined constraints. This is one type of fairness,
3
but since that word is heavily overloaded, we mostly avoid
using it. Inclusiveness is important for access control because
revocation of access rights and other negative permissions must
not be blocked by those who maintain the ledger.
Inclusiveness can be achieved with the help of third parties:
We first try to enter a new transaction into the ledger and then
check that it was actually entered. This check is reliable thanks
to the consistency property of the ledger. If the ledger fails to
include the transaction, we turn to the third parties whose job is
to audit the correct behavior of the ledger. The ledger cannot
refuse their request to enter the transaction, except when it
can prove that the new transaction would violate a defined
constraint. The process is optimistic in the sense that the third
parties need to be involved only if the ledger behaves in an
unfair way.
Linear order. The public ledger also defines a linear order
for all transactions. Unlike consistency and inclusiveness, the
linear order is not an obvious requirement. It just turns out to
be very useful for two reasons. First, sequential consistency
[1] is one of the strongest and best understood definitions
of consistency, and the explicit linear order makes it easy to
design the consistency mechanisms of the ledger. Second, the
linear order makes it easier to define various constraints (see
below) on the transactions and to decide which of multiple
conflicting transactions should succeed or fail. Sometimes,
however, partial order is sufficient if different interpretations
of it do not create inconsistent views of the ledger or enable
constraint violations.
Constraints. A public ledger may define some global con-
straints that must hold at all times. These are akin to global
safety properties [14] in parallel and distributed systems. The
constrains can be defined as global dependencies, such as total
sums or as the non-existence of a negative permission.
In Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies, the only global
constraint is the over-spending prevention: transactions that
would result in a key spending more of the currency than it has
received may not be entered into the ledger. This constraint is
defined in terms of the linear order of transactions, so that no
key is allowed to run into credit even temporarily.
In Sections IV and V, we will see examples of other global
constraints related to revocation and negative permissions.
Reconstructible history. In Bitcoin, it is possible to download
and verify all the transactions that have taken place globally
since the beginning of time. This creates confidence in the
cryptocurrency because it shows the apparent fairness of how
the money has been issued. In practice, though, someone using
Bitcoin only needs to go back a few blocks in the history.
Only those who join the P2P network of miners need to
reconstruct the full history. While this ability to download
all past transactions and to reconstruct the global history is
often seen as an essential part of public ledgers, it also puts
a heavy burden on the participants. As we will see in Section
IV, sometimes storing just a subset of the global events in the
ledger is sufficient.
Efficient verification and management. An interesting design
choice in Bitcoin is that it is focused on verifying past
monetary transactions rather than the current state of the
system, i.e. who holds money. While those in the P2P network
keep track of the current state, other parties cannot trust a
single member or even small part of the P2P network to
provide this information. Instead, the canonical way to verify
that someone has money is to make a payment with it and
check that the transaction has been entered into the blockchain.
This mechanism is, in part, because Bitcoin is focused on
the overspending detection, and checking that someone holds
money would not prevent them double spending it. In part,
it is due to the way the P2P network is rewarded: without
the fee paid for a new transaction, there is no incentive to
construct proofs of the system state. In other applications of
a public ledger, we may be interested in querying the global
state without changing it. In access control, we want to verify
access rights, role assignment, or group membership without
“spending” them.
As explained earlier, access control requires checking
of non-existence. The Bitcoin blockchain is not efficient in
verifying non-existence. First, it is not designed for efficient
search or compact proofs of non-existence. Second, as a hash
tree structure, the blockchain is extremely unbalanced if we
consider the links to the previous block as the left-most branch.
Proving non-existence of a transaction in the history is an
O(T ·log(ρ)) process where T is the length of the history and ρ
is the transaction rate. This can be compared to O(log(T · ρ))
in balanced trees. Security literature provides more efficient
hash-based data structures that allow fast searching based on
an index and also checking of non-existence [13], [18], [19].
The literature also provides optimized solutions for imple-
menting a public log with a small number of trusted parties. A
particularly important observation is that only one (untrusted)
third party is needed for maintaining the ledger if there are
many auditors that verify its actions [13]. Essentially, the
auditors will need to check that the history never changes,
compare the latest hashes of the history with other auditors,
and check that any specified constrains on the ledger have been
enforced.
Finally, it is tempting to sort the ledger data or to create
indexes or summaries to increase the efficiency of verification.
However, maintaining these optimizations cannot be left to the
care of an untrusted third party because they could be tampered
with to produce inconsistent views of the ledger. Thus, the sort
order, index or summary needs the same kind of auditing as the
ledger itself. In effect, redundancy in the ledger creates new
constrains that must be enforced and audited. It is necessary
to compare the efficiency gains in access-rights verification
to this increased cost of auditing. In this paper, we did not
find examples where the benefits of adding redundancy would
clearly outweigh the cost of auditing.
IV. REVOCATION IN A PKI AND HIERARCHICAL GROUPS
In this section, we discuss the revocation of certificate
chains in a PKI and apply the public ledger to the task.
Hierarchical group management with certificates is used as
the case study. The main goal of this section is to introduce
the issue of revocation and the basic solution components in
a relatively familiar setting. We will build on this basis in the
more complicated group-management scenarios of Section V.
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A. Certificate chains and group management
In a PKI, each user or other entity is represented by a
public-key pair [PK ,SK ]. The public key PK is used to
identify the entity, while its owner knows the private key SK .
When requesting access to a resource, the user or the owner
of the entity presents to the verifier a certificate chain
CH = C1 . . . Cn, where
Ci = 〈PK i−1,PK i, authi, validity i,Sig i−1〉
for i = 1 . . . n.
(2)
The details of the chain verification vary between systems, but
the process typically includes at least the following checks:
(1) the certificates form a chain so that the issuer of the next
certificate is always the subject of the previous one, and the
signatures are cryptographically valid, (2) the root key PK 0 is
authorized by some externa means to issue the first certificate,
(3) the issuer of each certificate after that is authorized by the
chain above, (4) the subject of the last certificate is the key that
signed the access request, and (5) none of the certificates has
expired or been revoked. We refer to these checks, excluding
revocation, as general checks. In the web PKI based on X.509,
the root key PK 0 is a trusted CA, while in SPKI, the root
key may be the owner of the requested resource. In the web
PKI, the issuers are authorized if the chain above delegates the
CA role. In key-oriented PKIs (e.g. SPKI), the rights passed
through the chain can be computed as the intersection ∪ authi.
Example 1: Alice uploads files to a folder at an online server
and authorizes Bob to access the folder. Bob delegates the
access further to his portable computer. When a file needs
to be printed, the computer delegates the right to read that
specific file to a cloud-based print server. If Alice revokes
Bob’s right to access, she would want both Bob’s computer
and the print server to lose their access without her taking
any additional steps.
The key-oriented PKIs can be used to implement the above
scenario so that each entity is represented by a public key and
each delegation step is encoded as a certificate. The certificates
chains are typically maintained in a distributed manner, so that
the issuer gives to the subject not only the new certificate but
also the preceding chain. When a client, such as the computer
or print server, requests access to the controlled resource, it
presents the chain of certificates, which starts from Alice, to the
server. Revocation cannot be enforced in the same distributed
way, though, because the server needs some way of checking
whether revocations exist.
Another observation is that we can interpret the entities in
the above example as a hierarchical group where Alice is the
owner and Bob a member that is able to add further members
to the hierarchy under himself. The hierarchy is more obvious
in the following scenario.
Example 2: An online data storage authorizes its users
to upload data to specific databases. The users authorize
Internet-of-Things gateways, which in turn authorize the
sensors that connect to them. The sensors data is sent to the
database with end-to-end integrity protection. The user can
revoke a gateway, in which case all the sensors connected to
it should also lose access. If the user is kicked out of the
service altogether, then all of his gateways and sensor should
go as well.
There are some general principles about revocation in PKIs.
First, most PKIs allow revocation of certificates but not of keys.
Key revocation would be equivalent to revoking all certificates
issued to or by the key. Second, if any one of the certificates in
the chain is revoked (or expires), the chain as a whole becomes
invalid. However, if a new certificate is issued to replace the
revoked one, the chain can be formed again by reusing the
rest of the certificates. Third, the revocation must identify
the revoked certificate by some unambiguous means, such as
by the combination of the issuer and a certificate identifier
(which is a serial number in X.509) or by a cryptographic
thumbprint of the certificate. Fourth, typically only the issuer
of a certificate can revoke it, and the revocation must be
signed by the same issuer as the certificate. Alternatively,
the certificate itself could identify the authorized revocation
key. Finally, fresh information about the relevant revocations
must be available to the verifier in such a way that existence
or non-existence of revocation can be reliably and efficiently
determined.
The availability question has caused quite a bit of debate. In
the web PKI, the verifier periodically downloads the certificate
revocation list from an address provided in the certificate, and
hard and soft limits may be set on how often the list needs to
be updated. SPKI, on the other hand, specifies no revocation
mechanism because the delivery of the negative information in
a truly distributed system cannot be guaranteed. SPKI tasks the
entity making an access request with providing all the evidence
needed for the access decision [9], and they certainly cannot be
trusted to tell about revocation. Instead, SPKI suggests periodic
refreshing of short-lived certificates. This is considered a purer
solution that makes explicit the difficulties of distributed access
control and avoids the problems of best-effort revocation. In
this paper, we ask whether it is feasible to make the revocation
information available in a public ledger to get around such
issues.
Although we write about chains (i.e. paths) here, the same
ideas generalize to sets of certificates that form trees or directed
acyclic graphs, in which multiple chains may be used together
to authorize the issuer of the following one. This is the case,
for example, in SPKI/SDSI, where the subject of a delegation
certificate may be a name, in which case another certificate or
chain is needed for resolving the name into a public key.
B. Revocation with public ledger
It is relatively straightforward to implement revocation with
a public ledger for the PKI applications discussed above. Be-
cause of the immutability and global consistency of the ledger,
a revocation event cannot be deleted, altered or hidden once it
has been entered into the ledger. Since the revocation is signed
by the issuer of the certificate (or by another key defined in
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the certificate itself), the verifier can easily validate the signed
revocation. The only difficult requirement for the ledger is that
there must be an efficient process for retrieving revocations and
for proving their non-existence in the ledger. Below, we use
the thumbprint of the certificate, i.e. its cryptographic hash
value, as the index by which revocation information is stored
and retrieved.
revokeCert: The issuer I of certificate C revokes it as follows:
1) Create a revocation record containing a hash of C:
RevC = 〈H(C), “revoke”,SigI〉. (3)
2) Submit RevC into the ledger with the index H(C).
3) Check that the revocation has been entered into the
ledger.
4) If the ledger does not respond or refuses to accept a
valid revocation record, raise an alarm.
Depending on the ledger implementation, there may be a
delay between steps 2 and 3 above. In that case, the server
should give a receipt of the submission to avoid delaying
tactics and disputes about whether the submission took place.
Ultimately, however, there can always be a dispute about which
party failed to complete the protocol. In such situations, the
solution is to submit the revocation through one or more
well-known auditors. Availability of such a fallback method
removes the incentive from the ledger to misbehave.
verifyChain: The verifier checks whether the chain of certifi-
cates CH is valid for an access request as follows:
1) Perform the general checks on CH .
2) Calculate H(Ci) for each certificate in the chain
and query the public ledger using this thumbprint
as the index. The public ledger must return either
a revocation record signed by the issuer of Ci or a
non-existence proof. The chain is valid only if a non-
existence proof is received for all the certificates.
3) If the ledger does not respond or the returned infor-
mation cannot be verified cryptographically, e.g. be-
cause it is malformed, raise an alarm.
For this type of PKI, the ledger does not need to hold any
positive information, i.e. the certificates. It is sufficient to make
only the negative information, i.e. the revocations, available in
the ledger.
An alternative to signing the revocation is to authenticate
it by revealing a hash pre-image. For this, the issuer generates
a fresh random number X and includes its hash H(X) in the
certificate. It keeps X secret and stores it safely for later use.
The issuer can revoke the certificate by publishing X in the
following revocation record in the ledger:
RX = 〈H(X), “revoke”, X〉. (4)
This solution does not suffer from the same kind of replay
attacks as many other authentication schemes based on hash
pre-images or Lamport hashes because replays can only help
in making X public. If the revocation record is published with
the index H(X), it is possible to use of the same X in multiple
certificates and to revoke them as a group. A possible extension
is to include multiple hashes in the certificate so that it belongs
to more than one such group.
C. Ledger implementation with Bitcoin
We first consider using the Bitcoin blockchain for certifi-
cate revocation. There are several possible ways to encode the
revocation messages of a key-oriented PKI (or even in X.509)
into the Bitcoin blockchain. Any such method will probably
make some use of the OP RETURN output that can embed
up to 80 bytes of arbitrary data to one Bitcoin transaction.
The main design choice is in how much of the structure of the
Bitcoin transaction history is reused. We have identified the
following two basic designs:
1) A Bitcoin address and, optionally, a revocation id
is included in the certificate. The certificate can be
revoked by making a payment from that address. The
payment transaction must have either the certificate
thumbprint or the revocation id in its OP RETURN
output.
2) The entire certificate is encoded as a Bitcoin transac-
tion: the payer is the issuer, payee is the subject, and
the OP RETURN output encodes the authorization
and expiry time. Revocation is a similar transaction
with a revocation flag encoded in OP RETURN. In
this solution, the delegation graph is isomorphic with
a subgraph of the Bitcoin transaction history. The 80-
byte limit on data in OP RETURN is quite restrictive,
though.
The problem with the above solutions is the limited query-
ing capability of the Bitcoin blockchain. There is no secure
way to know about current status of the certificates, especially
if one does not “run a full node”, i.e. receive and verify
all the transactions in the global P2P network. Furthermore,
while there are online services that can be used to search the
blockchain data, if they are used for determining absence of
items in the blockchain, they will effectively become trusted
third parties. Moreover, the 60-minute cooling period required
after a Bitcoin transaction means that even the most knowl-
edgeable nodes cannot know the exact current state of Bitcoin.
Transactions might be rolled back or buffered for inclusion in
a later block. Thus, we will next consider solutions that involve
a third party — although not a fully trusted one.
D. Ledger implementation by third party
We will now turn to a slightly more centralized implemen-
tation of the public ledger based on ideas surveyed in Section
II-C.
It is an inherent assumption in Bitcoin and its kin that
no single party can be relied to operate any critical part of the
system. Thus, these systems are structured around an open P2P
network where all computation and data storage is massively
replicated. Yet, most of the world’s information infrastructure
is operated by individual companies that have a business
interest in keeping them running. While there are frequent
questions about the honesty and fairness of such operators,
nobody seems to suspect their will to stay in business. For
example, one might suspect the honesty of an online poker
site (blockchain solutions to this have been suggested), but
there is hardly any reason to doubt that the site operator wants
the gaming to continue. Thus, it is reasonable to try to treat
continuity and honesty separately.
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Ledger architecture. The public ledger architecture that we
propose to use for revocation is shown in Figure 1. It is not
based on a P2P network. Instead, we have one third party,
called the untrusted third party (UTP) to emphasize the lack
of trust, and multiple trusted auditors that monitor its honesty.
This division of duties resembles for most part AKI [13]. Our
design goal is to leave heavy work to the UTP, while keeping
the workload of the auditors and clients relatively small.
Fig. 1. Ledger architecture with UTP and auditors
We defer the full details of the ledger implementation
until Section V. One possibility is to let the UTP store the
lexicographically sorted revocations in the leaves of a Merkle
hash tree, similar to AKI. Another possibility is a Merkle prefix
tree like the one used in CONIKS. In the former case, the
complexity of searching for an index H(X) is O(log(N)) in
which N is the number of records. In the latter case it is O(L)
where L is the length of the cryptographic hash, which should
be long enough to avoid collisions. We build on the latter
structure. Proofs of presence and absence in the tree will be
covered below.
V. DYNAMIC GROUP MEMBERSHIP REVOCATION
This section presents the main technical contribution of the
paper. We discuss the problems of distributed, certificate-based
group membership management in a dynamic setting where
the group does not have a fixed hierarchical structure. We also
describe a technical solution.
A. Dynamic group membership and revocation
We will extend the discussion of the previous sections to
groups that have no strict hierarchical structure. This section
introduces the new concepts through a series of example
scenarios, which motivate the definitions that follow.
Example 3: An online course may have a group of admins
and a group of users. The admins have the authority to add
new admins and users and to remove existing ones. When
Alice hands over the course to a new teacher Bob, she adds
him to the admins. Bob then adds his teaching assistant Carol
as an admin. Later, Carol cleans up the system settings and
removes Alice, who no longer needs access, from the list of
admins.
This is the kind of system that we aim to define and
implement, but in a distributed setting where signed messages
(i.e. certificates and revocations) are the way to communicate
and where negative is difficult to prove. The hierarchical PKI
solution of Section IV will not quite work because Alice needs
to be revoked by someone below her in the certificate chain,
and because revoking Alice should not cause automatically the
removal of Bob and Carol.
Since we are interested in systems of devices and services
as well as users, we will use the words leaders and members,
respectively, in place of admins and users. In this paper, these
two roles are assigned and revoked separately. In many appli-
cations, all leaders are members, and in some like the following
example, or all members are leaders. Implementations can
handle these situations efficiently by including multiple roles
in a single certificate or revocation message.
Example 4: David’s personal devices form a group where
his personal information is conveniently exchanged among
the members. David can use any one of the devices to add a
new device to the group or to remove one. When David buys
a new phone, he first adds it to the group using his old phone.
Later, when the new phone is fully operational, he sells the
old one to his friend Erik and then remembers to remove it
from his device group.
We now start to see what the potential security issues are.
Unlike the online course’s user accounts, David’s personal de-
vices form a distributed system where the negative information
of revoking a member may not be communicated immediately
to all relevant parties. Moreover, conflicts may arise, as in the
following.
Example 5: David’s friend Erik is a l33t hacker and immedi-
ately recovers the device’s secret credentials from its memory.
He then tries to revoke David’s new phone from the group in
an attempt to take over the management of David’s devices
and data. Luckily, David remembered to revoke the old phone
from the group in time, before Erik could remove the new
phone from the group’s leaders.
Such race conditions are a natural part of distributed access
control. While Erik in the story is the malicious party, the
access control system is necessarily agnostic about which
device should win the race to revoke the other. Instead, our
goal is to ensure that information about revocations is globally
consistent and propagated reliably. No situation should arise
where the current leadership of the group is ambiguous. This
is where a public ledger can help.
We again take a key-oriented approach to group manage-
ment. That is, users or devices are represented by key pairs and
identified by their public keys. In our solution, any user can
create a group by generating a key pair [PKO, SKO] (use of
permanent personal keys is not recommended) and giving the
group a name. The group is then identified by the combination
of the public key PKO and the name.
G = G(PKO,name) (5)
In a sense, all such groups exist without being explicitly
created. Borrowing the notation of SDSI [21], we could refer
to this group as PKO’s name. We take from SDSI the idea
that names must be defined in the namespace of some public
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key but, because of revocation, the semantics of our groups
will otherwise be quite different from SDSI.
As in the hierarchical PKI, adding members will be repre-
sented by certificates, which specify the role R of the members
in the group and are issued by some leader’s key PKL at a
time t:
CU = 〈PKL,PKU , G,R, “add”, tL, SigL〉t, (6)
These signed documents represent add-member events that
occurred at a specific time t, when they were issued. For now,
let us assume that we have a global view of the system and
know the time and order of the events, and that no two events
occurred exactly at the same time. Of course, there are no
reliable global clocks in a distributed system, and we cannot
trust the signer’s timestamp tL for ordering the events. Below,
we will resolve this problem by defining t as the order in which
the certificates or revocations were added to the public ledger.
Revoking members will be represented by signed revoca-
tions, which are events similar to the certificates:
RevU = 〈PKL,PKU , G,R, “revoke”, tL,SigL〉t. (7)
The main difference to Section IV is that these revocations
apply to keys instead of certificates. A revocation will invali-
date a key’s role in a group regardless of how many different
certificates have previously been issued to assign it. Moreover,
a group leader has the authority to revoke any members in its
group no matter which leader added them. Therefore, to verify
a revocation, additional work may be needed to verify that the
issuer of the revocation is a current leader.
Finally, we get to define who is a group member or
leader. We do this by iterating through the events in the
global time order. By definition, there is an initial event e0
at time zero which makes the key PKO leader of the group
G = G(PKO,name) for all keys PKO and all names. No
other roles are initially assigned. Consider globally all the
events related to the group G and sort them to a global history
by their timestamps t. This will produce a sequence of events
e0 . . . eN . An event et is authorized if its issuer PKO is a
leader in the group G after the previous event et−1 in the global
time order. The group membership after the event differs from
the membership before the event as follows: If the event ei
is authorized and it is a member certificate, then PKU has
new role R in the group G after the event. If the event is
authorized and it is a revocation, then PKU does not have
role R in the group G after the event. These rules determine
the group members and their roles through the global history
of events. The current state of the system is the role assignment
after the latest event in the global history.
B. Membership revocation with public ledger
This section will consider how the public ledger, as an
abstraction, can be used to implement secure revocation of
dynamic group members. Since a revocation can be issued by
any leader of the respective group, storing only the revocations
in the ledger, as we did in Section IV, is not sufficient. The
verifier needs to also be able to check that the issuer of the
revocation was a leader at the time. The challenge here is to
choose which information is stored in the ledger and how to
efficiently verify the issuer of any revocation.
We will start with a simple approach that is not efficient
but illustrates the challenge. Naturally, we assume that the
information stored in the ledger is immutable (i.e. append-
only) and the views that the ledger provides to different parties
are consistent. Also, the ledger must accept all submitted valid
events within a reasonable time. Beside the revocations, the
clients also enter certificates into the ledger. The ledger stores
all events with an index value, which is the cryptographic
hash H(G,R,PKU ) of the group and role identifiers and the
subject’s public key. Anyone can query the ledger for the list
of events with a given index value (the answer may be an
empty list if there are no members). The ledger also provides
a proof that this list is complete. This way, to check whether
a user has a specific role in a specific group, the verifier can
first query the certificates that have been issued to the user.
It then queries the certificates that have been issued to the
issuer of each of those certificates. This process is repeated
until the verifier has found a valid certificate chain all the
way back to the group’s key PKO. Although this is only a
rough description of the process and other details need to be
specified, it can be seen that checking the membership of a
user with this solution might involve building the whole graph
of relations between the group’s members. Furthermore, if the
ledger does not validate its input, malicious parties could insert
fake certificates into the ledger to extend the graph so that the
verification process becomes even more complicated.
To improve the efficiency of validity checks, we modify
amend the above ledger design in several ways:
1) The ledger is used as a time-stamping service that
gives all events (both member certificates and revo-
cations) related to one group and role a global linear
order.
2) To add a revocation to the ledger, the issuer must
prove with a certificate chain that it is a leader of the
group and, thus, authorized to issue the event.
3) The ledger must check the validity of revocations
before entering them into the ledger, and it must store
the certificate chain that authorized the revocation.
In addition to item 2 above, we expect ledger imple-
mentations to also check the validity of member certificates
before giving them a timestamp and entering them into the
ledger. Such a check may be done to prevent denial-of-service
attackers from filling the ledger with invalid events. However,
this check is not needed for the correctness of membership
management and we therefore omit it in the discussion below.
Item 3 in the list above is needed for efficiency reasons.
More specifically, the ledger requires a new revocation Rev to
be accompanied by a certificate chain CH rev that authorizes
Rev . The ledger validates CH rev. This includes checking for
the absence of revocations for all the certificates in CH rev.
The ledger then gives Rev a timestamp t, enters Rev into
the ledger, and stores also CH rev. Later, the ledger is able to
present CH rev as an easily checkable proof that the revocation
Rev was valid at time t. This will enable membership verifica-
tion with computation and communication complexity O(n),
where n is the length of the longest certificate chain in the
ledger.
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As earlier, the member certificates are maintained by the
members themselves. Each member PKU of group G =
G(PKO,name) has a chain of certificates CH U that starts
from the key PKO. When a group leader adds a member
to the group, it appends the new certificate to the chain and
communicates the extended chain to the new member. When
the member needs to prove its membership, e.g. to make
an access request or to submit an event to the ledger, it
attaches this certificate chain to the request. The receiving
party will then verify the chain and check the public ledger
for revocations.
The ledger gives each event a sequence number, and this
number is considered to be the global timestamp t. The ledger
must assign these numbers sequentially (This is an internal
constrain that the ledger implementation must enforce, as we
will see later!). To detect outdated messages and replay attacks,
the issuer of an event includes in the signed certificate or
revocation the latest ledger sequence number that it knows tL.
The ledger requires tL in the event to be greater than the time
of the last event recorded for the same index H(G,R,PKU ).
This way, updates from leaders will be rejected if they are
not based on the latest status of the key in the group and
role. In addition to preventing accidental reordering of member
certification and revocation events, this prevents attacks that
intentionally delay events to cause reordering and, thus, change
the outcome to something that was not intended by any of the
issuers.
The detailed processes are described below.
addMember: A group leader PKL adds PKU to role R in
the group G as follows:
1) Issue a member certificate
CU = 〈PKL,PKU , G,R, “add”, tL,SigL〉.
2) Submit CU into the public ledger with index
H(G,R,PKU ). Send to the ledger also a certificate
chain CH that authorizes PKL as a group leader.
(The ledger is not required to check CH but may
do so in order to refuse storing invalid member
certificates.)
3) Check that CU has been given a timestamp t > tL
and that it has been entered into the ledger.
4) If the ledger does not respond or refuses to accept
CU without a valid reason, raise an alarm.
Before the presenting the processes for revocation and
verification, we define the following subprocess:
checkChain subprocess: A verifier checks that a certificate
chain CH = C1 . . . Cn is valid and authorizes PKU to role
R in the group G = G(PKO,name) as follows:
1) Perform the general checks on the chain. In the case
of membership certificates, this means that (1) the
certificates form a chain so that the issuer of the next
certificate is always the subject of the previous one,
and the signatures are valid, (2) the root key is PKO,
(3) all the certificates delegate the leader role in G,
except the last certificate, which delegates the role R,
and (4) the subject of the last certificate is PKU .
2) For each certificate Ci in CH , retrieve from
the ledger its ledger timestamp ti and the list
of events stored in the ledger with the index
H(G, “leader”,PK i−1), where PK i−1 is the issuer
of Ci. Receive also a proof of completeness of each
list. From the list retrieved for each i, check that
the leader role of the issuer PK i−1 has not been
revoked between ti−1 and ti (where t0 = 0). For
PKU = PKn, check that its role R has not been
revoked after tn.
3) Return “success” or “fail” depending on whether all
the above checks succeed. If any one of the issuers
PK i has been revoked, return the revocation Rev in
addition to the “fail” status.
revokeMember: A group leader PKL revokes role R of PKU
in the group G as follows:
1) Issue a revocation:
RevU = 〈PKL,PKU , G,R, “revoke”, tL, SigL〉.
2) Submit RevU into the public ledger with index
H(G,R,PKU ). Send to the ledger also a certificate
chain CH rev that authorizes PKL as a group leader.
(The ledger must check this authorization and store
the chain CH rev. It can be stored in the ledger or in
a secondary storage.)
3) Check that RevU has been given a timestamp t and
entered into the ledger.
4) If the ledger declines the revocation because CH rev is
not valid, it must tell the reason. The only expected
reason is a revocation Rev ′ in the ledger which makes
the chain CH rev invalid and which the leader did
not know about. In that case, the ledger provides
Rev ′. Retrieve from the ledger the chain CH ′rev
that authorized Rev ′, and check the correctness of
the server’s reason with the checkChain process on
CH ′rev.
5) If the ledger does not respond or refuses to accept
RevU without a valid reason, raise an alarm.
verifyMember: The verifier checks whether the chain of
certificates CH proves that PKU has role R in the group G
as follows:
1) Check the chain CH with the checkChain process. If
checkChain returns “success”, then PKU has role R
in G.
2) If checkChain returns “fail” and includes revocation
Rev as the reason, retrieve from the ledger the
certificate chain CH rev that authorized Rev . Check
CH rev with the checkChain process. If this second
call to checkChain returns “success”, then CH does
not give PKU the role R in G.
3) If the second call to checkChain returns “fail”, raise
an alarm because the ledger is storing the revocation
Rev without a valid authorization for it.
4) If the ledger does not respond or returns a syntacti-
cally or cryptographically invalid revocation record,
raise an alarm.
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C. Security considerations
The above processes naturally should implement the mem-
bership semantics that we defined earlier in Section V-B.
Proposition 1: The processes described above enable the
verifier to determine correctly whether a key is a member or
leader of a group.
We present informal reasoning to support Proposition 1: In
Section V-A, we defined the semantics of group membership
in the global history of member certification and revocation
events. The certificate chain CH in step 1 of the verifyMember
process is a subset of the global history: one path of leader
certificates from the initial event e0 at time zero to the
present time. The verifier first checks that, if we look at the
subset alone, it would prove the membership. Now, the only
events outside the subset that could change this outcome are
revocations. Step 2 of the checkChain subprocess checks that
no effectively timed revocations exist in the global history.
Thus, if CH actually authorizes the membership of PKU in G,
the process returns “success”. On the other hand, if there exists
a revocation in the global history that invalidates CH , then
the ledger provides as evidence a such revocation Rev and the
chain CH rev that authorized Rev . The verifier calls checkChain
again to check that CH rev is valid. Again, the only events
outside the subset of CH ∪ {Rev} ∪CH rev that could change
the outcome are further revocations that invalidate CH rev. The
ledger must prove that no such revocations exist in the ledger.
When the ledger does this, the verifier knows that CH does
not authorize role R in G for PKU . The only reason why this
might not happen is if the ledger actually contains a revocation
that invalidates CH rev, but that would be irrefutable evidence
of the ledger’s misbehavior because it stores the revocation
Rev without having an authorizing certificate chain for it.
While the reasoning above should satisfy us that the proce-
dures implement the desired semantics, it does not mean that
malicious entities cannot do anything harmful. For example,
if a leader is compromised and acts fast, it can revoke other
leaders and take over the group, or it may revoke everyone
and thus destroy the group.
One interesting case is a semi-malicious group leader who
does not want to disrupt the group operation but wants to
avoid being revoked from it. This could, for example, be the
case in Examples 4 and 5 where Erik may want the phone to
stay in David’s device group, so that it continues to receive
David’s personal information. Such a semi-malicious leader,
or a clique of them, could keep adding their own keys to the
dynamic group at a fast rate, so that they become effectively
irrevocable by other leaders. The group would still operate as
normal in all other respects. In order to resolve this kind of
situations, we allow a group leader to suspend all other leaders
and temporarily reserve exclusive leadership in the group. It
can do this by sending special suspend and resume events to
the ledger:
SuspendG = 〈PKL, G, “suspend”, tL,SigL〉t
ResumeG = 〈PKL, G, “resume”, tL,SigL〉t.
(8)
These events are published in the ledger for transparency.
Between the suspend and resume, PKL is the only key allowed
to issue new certificates or revocations to the group. It can
thus analyze the membership and expel the unwanted leaders.
Identifying the bad keys naturally requires processes that are
outside the technical implementation. While the compromised
leaders could maliciously suspend the group, that is no worse
than other denial-of-service attacks that they can mount, such
as revoking all members. What we achieve is preventing the
semi-malicious attackers from hanging on for an unlimited
time without doing anything explicitly malicious.
The suspension is effectively a lock on the group in the
ledger database, which makes is possible to execute complex
processes as atomic operations. This feature can have further
uses beyond the revocation of semi-malicious cliques. Nat-
urally, it should only be used in exceptional circumstances
because of the performance penalty that such locks have in a
distributed system.
D. Ledger implementation by a third party
This section will show how the public ledger that was used
as an abstract service in Section V-B can be implemented at a
reasonable cost. We continue to use the architecture of Figure 1
with the untrusted third party UTP and independent auditors.
Ledger data structure. The UTP stores the ledger as a single
Merkle prefix tree in a way similar to CONIKS [18]. A Merkle
prefix tree is basically a binary tree where each path down
the tree corresponds to a unique bit string x. Each bit in x
represents either a left or right turn on the way down. We
denote by Vx the node that corresponds to the x. If Vx is a
leaf node, it can be indexed by x but also by a longer bit string
that begins with x.
The events are stored in the leaves, which are indexed
by the hash value H(G,R,PKU ). The events related to the
same group G, role R and subject key PKU are bundled
together into an append-only list, as seen in Figure 2. The
most recent record is at the end of the list. The list additionally
stores a ledger-assigned sequence number t, which we also call
timestamp because it is used in place of global time.
Fig. 2. Merkle prefix tree with 2 entries stored in the leaf with index “010”
We use SHA-256 for the hash function H but only extend
each branch of the tree down to the lowest level where no
two input 〈G,R,PKU 〉 map to the same path. Thanks to the
collision-freeness of the hash function, such a depth is always
found. As more events are added to the tree, it slowly becomes
deeper.
The advantage of the single-tree structure for the ledger is
that it is not necessary to audit consistency between two dif-
ferent trees. The timestamps, however, create similar internal
constrains to the ledger data structure, and auditors are needed
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to enforce their sequential assignment. Note, however, that the
UTP is responsible for linearizing the events and assigning the
numbers and, hence, it is able to make minor changes to their
order before entering them into the ledger. Minor reordering
and gaps in the sequence numbers may also occur if multiple
CPUs process updates in parallel and each is assigned a small
range of timestamps at a time.
The UTP calculates a hash value hx for each node Vx in
the tree as follows. The hash of a leaf node is a cumulative
hash of the event list stored in the leaf node, including their
sequence numbers, and the leaf node’s full index (e.g. 256
bits as opposed to the 25-bit path to the leaf). The value of a
non-leaf node is the hash of its two children:
hx = H(hx0, hx1) (9)
However, if either the left or right branch of the tree does not
continue, the child value is zero (either hx = H(0, hx1) or
hx = H(hx0, 0)).
The hash value computed for the root of the tree, denoted
by hroot , summarizes the whole data structure. Periodically
(e.g. once a minute), the UTP appends the latest value of
hroot into a hash chain along with the latest ledger and UTC
timestamps:
hiblock = H(h
i−1
block , hroot , tlatest, tUTC) (10)
The values of this hash chain are signed and published to the
auditors. The hash chain ensures that if the UTP ever forks or
modifies the history, clients can detect its malicious behavior
by comparing notes with each other or with the auditors.
Ledger operations. The UTP needs to support operations that
are required by the procedures described in Section V-B and by
the auditors. In particular, it must accept valid certificates and
revocations from clients, allow the verifier to query presence
of objects in the ledger by their index values, and send event
data to the auditors for auditing.
To check for the presence or absence of an event in the
ledger, the UTP follows the path determined by the index
H(G,R,PKU ) in the Merkle prefix tree. On the way down, it
accumulates a proof as a list of the hashes of the siblings of the
path. That is, at any non-leaf node hx on the way down, if the
next bit in the index is 0, the ledger appends hx1 to the list, and
if the next bit is 1, the ledger appends hx0. If the search down
the tree reaches a leaf node Vx and the index stored in the leaf
node matches the full index H(G,R,PKU ), the UTP appends
the list of the hashes of events and timestamps stored in the
leaf. This list is the proof of presence. On the other hand, if the
index stored in the leaf node does not match the full index, or
if the search down the tree terminates at a non-existing branch,
the so-far accumulated list of hash values becomes the proof
of absence. These are the proofs of completeness received by
the client in Section V-B.
When a client submits a revocation to the ledger in the
removeMember process, the UTP must verify it before adding
it into the Merkle tree. For certificates submitted in the add-
Member process, the verification is optional but probably will
be done by most ledger implementations. For simplicity, we
assume below that the ledger only contains verified events. The
main part of the verification process is to check that the issuer
of the new event is a group leader. For this membership check,
the process is similar to checkChain in the previous section.
The only difference is that the UTP does not need to prove
presence or absence as it trusts its own information.
If the submitted event e is valid, the UTP must immediately
return a signed proof of delivery (POD) before writing any data
to the tree:
POD = SigUTP (e, h
i
block , tlatest, tUTC) (11)
The purpose of the latest block hashes and the ledger and UTC
timestamps is to bind the receipt to the various notions of time
in the system. The POD is, in effect, a promise by the UTP
that it will include the certificate in the ledger as soon as it is
technically possible. This receipt will be used as proof of UTP
misbehavior if it fails to enter the event into the ledger. The
user then has to wait until the next block update before it can
verify that the event has been included. The user should not
trust the UTP but periodically compares the UTP-presented
block hashes with the ones published by the auditors.
Auditor operations. The task of the auditors is to verify only
the following:
1) The append-only property of the ledger, i.e. that new
events are added but old ones are not altered or
deleted.
2) The timestamp t for new events grows monotonically.
There may be two kinds of auditors. The first kind main-
tains a copy of the entire ledger. It receives or downloads
new events from the UTP and updates its copy of the ledger
accordingly. It computes and publishes the block hashes hiblock
for the benefit of the clients. It may also compare the latest
block hash with the UTP’s version as well as with other
auditors.
The second kind of auditor is what we have aimed for in the
ledger design: the auditor receives from the UTP a stream of
events with proofs of updates to the ledger. A proof of update
is simply a proof of absence followed by a proof of presence.
Since the two proofs differ only for a very small part, sending
the two does not take much more space than one. Furthermore,
the UTP only needs to send the hashes of the events without
any details since they are sufficient for the auditor to calculate
the root hash. The proofs enable the auditor to compute the
root hash before and after each update. The auditor does not
need to save any ledger data. It simply checks that the root
hashes form an unbroken sequence between two consecutive
block hashes. It then publishes the verified block hashes as its
view of the ledger.
Figure 3 depicts examples of the tree updates with two new
entries. Such updates and proofs of presence and absence are
the main functions of the ledger.
The auditor should store the latest UTP-signed block hash
to prove misbehavior by UTP in case inconsistencies or
mutations are detected in the history. Such errors must be
published and will erode severely clients’ trust in the UTP.
Another task for the auditors is to help and act as a witness
for any client whose valid events the UTP has refused and, if
necessary, to submit them on the client’s behalf.
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Fig. 3. Example of how the root hashes form a chain when two entries, e1 (with index “001”) and e2 (with index “01”), are inserted to the tree between
h1block and h
2
block . The chain is valid if h
1
root matches h
1
block , h
2
root is equal to h
3
root and h
4
root matches h
2
block
The auditors may be set up by major clients of the ledger,
or they may be independent organizations. The second kind of
auditor, i.e. one that verifies the individual update proofs, can
be implemented by multiple parties by taking turns. As long
as the hash sequence between each two consecutive blocks
is verified by at least one trusted auditor, the UTP cannot
misbehave without being detected. It is a good idea for an
auditor to audit multiple UTPs (i.e. multiple ledgers), so that
its own business is not threatened if it has to reveal misbehavior
by the UTP.
E. Combining two types of revocation
In practical systems, we may encounter both types of
groups: hierarchical groups where revocation invalidates the
entire downward certificate chain (Section IV) and dynamic
groups where leaders can revoke those above themselves in the
delegation chain (this section). We can support the second type
of revocation with the certificate RevC of formula 3, which
we reformat slightly to match the current system:
RevC = 〈PKL, H(C), “revoke”, tL,SigL〉t. (12)
The certificate revocations will be stored in the ledger with
the index H(C). As with all revocations, the issuer presents an
authorizing certificate chain CH rev to the ledger, which stores
it. When verifying a certificate chain CH (in checkChain),
the verifier queries the ledger for the index H(Ci) on each
certificate Ci in the chain. If a revocation with authorizing
chain is found for any Ci, the chain CH is not considered
valid.
Because of their drastic effect, the certificate revocations
should be used only in well-considered ways. Otherwise, a
group leader could, for example, accidentally revoke itself and
all other leaders, thus incapacitating the group. One way to use
the certificate revocation is to tag a group as hierarchical, so
that all revocation in it is recursive. Another solution is to tag a
certificate as hierarchical and propagate this tag down the chain
to newer certificates, which effectively creates a hierarchical
subgroup. We expect that future experiments with such designs
will clarify the best patterns.
F. Ledger implementation with Bitcoin?
It is possible to store arbitrary information in the Bitcoin
blockchain and, thus, consider it published. However, we have
not found a practical way of mapping the dynamic group
membership management to Bitcoin so that it would support
revocation. We could, quite elegantly, use Bitcoin for mono-
tonically growing groups as follows. The Bitcoin addresses
would represent users. The groups created by a user would be
identified by the pair 〈address, name〉. The certificates would
be small money transfers with the group name and member
role encoded in the OP RETURN data. These transfers would
be made from existing leaders to new leaders or members.
Anyone could thus create a group and start issuing member
and leader certificates. The only obvious way of revoking such
membership, however, would be another transaction from the
same leader who added the member, or possibly from the
group creator. What we have not discovered is a mechanism by
which an arbitrary group leader (from a different branch of the
group) could revoke members added by the other leaders. One
problem is that discovering such revocations requires extensive
searching or traversal of the Bitcoin transaction graph. An
even harder problem would be to check the absence of such
revocations without keeping a full copy of the blockchain.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We originally designed our ledger mechanism for group-
based access control in a credential management software
where the ultimate goal was to share access codes, passwords
and other information among groups of people or devices. In
that system, data is shared through an online service operated
by a company that does not want to become a trusted third
party. (The details of how credentials are shared and accessed
among the group are beyond the scope of this paper.) We
implemented a prototype of the ledger and group membership
system, including client, ledger and auditor, in order to demon-
strate and evaluate its feasibility. The implementation supports
both hierarchical and dynamic groups in the same ledger. The
solution is generic and can be applied to group management in
other distributed applications where there is an untrusted third
party who is willing to maintain the ledger.
Figure 4 illustrates how the two types of membership and
revocation were combined in our functional test scenarios for
the prototype: dynamic membership for groups of users, and
hierarchical groups for one user’s devices. Specifically, the
system allows users to form groups, in which there are leaders
and members. A user can form a group by creating a key
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Solution Memory Bandwidth CPU Scalability
Auditor maintains a copy of the ledger 397 MB 72 B/update 19 607 updates/s multi-threading possible
Auditor verifies individual update proofs 288 B 875 B/update 10 526 updates/s scales easily
TABLE I. AUDITOR RESOURCE USE WHEN THE LEDGER HAS 106 USERS AND 107 ENTRIES
Fig. 4. Two types of groups in the prototype
pair, adding itself as a leader, deleting the group’s key, and
starting to add others to the group with its own key. The user
can also delegate to his devices the membership in the groups
to which he belongs. The devices can delegate the received
rights further to other devices. The membership is represented
by certificates, which together with revocations are published
in the ledger as described in the earlier sections.
Before running the performance measurements, we simu-
lated 106 users and devices that gradually formed groups until
there were 107 certificate and revocation entries in the ledger.
The average path length in the Merkle prefix tree became
48. After this, we executed the performance measurements by
verifying certificate chains and adding new certificates to the
ledger.
The prototype was written with Python (2.7.11) and the
M2Crypto (0.25.1) cryptography library. We used SHA-256 as
the hash function and RSA-2048 keys as the entity identities.
We tested the prototype on a 3.4GHz Intel(R) Zeon(R) E3-
1231 machine with 32GB of RAM.
Cost of adding certificates and revocations to the ledger.
To insert a new certificate to the Merkle prefix tree, all the
nodes on the path from the updated leaf to the root need to be
updated. Our ledger server took, on average, 265 ns to insert a
new entry to the tree and to collect the proof of update for the
second-type auditors. This figure does not include signature
verification. The average proof of update was less than 1 kB
in size.
When adding revocations, the ledger is required to verify
the authorizing certificate chain. For adding certificates, the
chain verification is optional but we chose to implement it.
Cost of verifying certificate chains. We measured the average
number of chain verifications that the server can handle per
second when the length of the certificate chains was quite large
(L = 50). Since the verification does not involve updating the
ledger, it is easy to parallelize. Our UTP server was able to
verify on average 9385 certificate chains per second with an
eight-core processor. Also, we expect the typical length of the
chains to be shorter than 50, which will result in proportionally
better performance.
Auditing cost. We compared two implementations of the
auditor: one that maintains a copy of the ledger and one that
verifies the proofs of update step by step without keeping any
ledger data in memory.
The memory use of the first auditor is naturally greater.
The copy of the ledger requires 2 ∗ N hashes, which is N ·
64 bytes, for N certificates and revocations. In contrast, the
second auditor that verifies individual proofs does not require
any significant storage space.
The bandwidth use of the auditors depends on the trans-
action rate. The first auditor in our implementation needs to
receive 72 bytes per update, which contain the index, the
sequence number, and the hash of the entry. On the other hand,
the second auditor without a copy of the ledger needs to receive
the logarithmic-size proof of update, which was less than 1 kB
in our experiments but grows logarithmically with the size of
the ledger.
When running on a single CPU core, the first auditor was
able to process about twice as many updates per second as
the second one. This is expected because checking the update
proof requires the auditor to verify both old and new hashes.
The auditors’ update rates were approximately 20000 and
10000 updates per second, respectively.
With the first-type auditors, which keep a copy of the tree,
the tree update process at the ledger and at the auditor can be
parallelized as follows. The root node of the tree is a bottleneck
because only one thread can be updating it at a time. This
bottleneck can be avoided if the auditors maintain a copy of
the prefix of the tree down to some depth d, e.g. d = 10, and
the hashes in the prefix are recomputed only for the periodic
block hashes. That way, the UTP can have up to 2d processor
working on different subtrees, without sharing any memory
between them. Each processor’s copy of the prefix will take
an 2d+1 ·32 bytes, which is only 64 kB of memory for d = 10.
VII. DISCUSSION
This section describes the lessons that we have learned
from this research and some possible extensions to the pro-
posed ledger.
A. Lessons learned
As we have seen, the public ledger is a suitable abstraction
for implementations of distributed access control, including
group-based ones, that require global consistency and enforce-
ment of global constraints. This is the case, in particular,
for revocation and negative permissions, which often cannot
be checked without a global view of the system. Generic
block-chain solutions enforce several fundamental security
properties: immutability and global consistency of the event
history, a linear order on all data entries, and fairness in
the sense that all valid data is included. These properties are
generic enough to be useful for most distributed access-control
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applications. We have, however, seen that different applications
may have different requirements: they may need the public
ledger to enforce special global constraints, and they may need
different ways of indexing the ledger for data retrieval and
proofs of presence and absence. This means that no one ledger
architecture and implementation is sufficient for all purposes.
We also observed that some application constrains can be
mapped to Bitcoin and its over-spending detection, while some
do not map easily or at all. The main problem with Bitcoin,
though, is the lack of support for querying the current state
securely. The best view of the global state is held by the
miners in the P2P network, but even they cannot be sure who
holds money at the moment. Instead, the verifier can achieve
certainty only by receiving the money: if the transaction is
successful, it can be verified from the blockchain. But this is
not the way access rights are queried. One would like to prove
authorization without giving it away.
It may be possible to map the concepts of distributed access
control and group membership onto generic block-chain sys-
tems, such as Ethereum. Security literature, however, provides
efficient public-log solutions based on (untrusted) third parties
and independent auditors that form an alternative to the P2P
network and competitive mining process of cryptocurrencies.
They are also environmentally more sound as they waste less
computing resources. Contrasting these more specialized pub-
lic logs to blockchains helps in understanding the properties
of both and may benefit research on both sides. In addition to
avoiding the massive overhead and redundant work done in the
P2P network, the alternative solutions fix the balance of the
blockchain data structure, which can be seen as an extremely
unbalanced hash tree. Our design and experiments show that
such designs can work well for fairly generic distribute access-
control tasks such as group management.
One more technical lesson is that there are difficult trade-
offs related to redundancy in the ledger data structure. On
one hand, it can be ordered conveniently or enriched with
additional index or summary information that helps application
development; on the other hand, redundancy such as index
trees, summary data, or even a monotonic numbering scheme,
introduces security-critical internal constrains. It is necessary
to check consistency between the ledger and the index or
summary data. This checking may be too costly compared
to the achieved efficiency gains. We note that revocation and
negative permissions can be implemented relatively efficiently,
and without redundancy in the data structure, when it is not
necessary to check the mutual order of events but only their
presence or absence. When the mutual order of all events needs
to be stored, we show that a separate chronological tree is not
needed.
It is important to realize that even an ideal public ledger
cannot solve all the problems of distributed access control. Be-
cause of asynchronous communication or temporary network
partitioning, conflicting decisions by different authorities are a
fact of life. By imposing a linear order on the events as they
are recorded into the ledger, we can reach something akin to
sequential consistency: the end result is in accordance with
some — arbitrarily chosen — linear order of the submitted
events. Together with fairness, i.e. limit on the time anyone’s
data has to wait, this is probably the best we can expect.
We also noted the need to avoid accidental or malicious
reordering of events when it would change the outcome of the
access control decision to something that was not wanted by
any one of the distributed decision makers. Our solution was
to reject entries to the ledger if they are not based on up-to-
date state information. Such qualitative rules of freshness are
preferable to timeouts because the round-trips in distributed
systems can vary hugely from milliseconds to days, e.g., if a
device is switched off or out of the wireless coverage area.
B. Possible extensions
Certificate validity times and temporary revocations. The
group-management solution presented in Section V does not
mention expiry times. Thus, the membership certificates re-
main valid until revoked. It would be tempting to include a
UTC validity period in the certificates, similar to that in X.509.
Handling such validity periods needs to be done with care,
however. In X.509, the certificate verifier is only interested
in whether the certificates are valid at the time of the chain
verification, which it can do by comparing with a relatively
accurate clock. In the dynamic group management scenario,
on the other hand, the verifier needs to know the order of past
events, which cannot be determined from the verifier’s clock.
Moreover, even very small differences in clocks or message
propagation time could lead to different interpretations of
whether a revocation is authorized or not. No matter how
accurate the clocks are and how coarsely the expiry times
are specified, a margin for such errors always remains if
the expiration time is interpreted independently by different
parties.
The solution to this problem is to let the untrusted third
party to decide on one consistent view of the order of all
events, including the expiry of certificates. That is, the certifi-
cate expiry event (or beginning of the validity period) should
be entered into the ledger when it occurs. This puts additional
requirements on the auditors, though, because they must check
that the UTP is entering the expiry events into the ledger at
the right UTC times, within some specified error margin.
This further calls our attention to the question whether
a revocation can have a validity period. Such a temporary
revocation, i.e. suspension, of access rights can be useful, for
example, when there is uncertainty about whether a lost device
is compromised or in a safe place. Compared to revoking
and re-issuing the certificate, the temporary revocation has the
advantage that the group leader does not need to be active and
online to revert the temporary revocation. We can implement
temporary revocation by adding an optional UTC validity
period to the signed revocation message. Just like with the
certificates, the UTP should add the expiry events to the linear
order of the ledger when they occur.
Role inheritance and RBAC support. So far, we have con-
sidered only two kinds of roles, leader and member, which are
assigned independently. In practical systems, more roles could
be defined, such as owner or guest. This calls into question the
wisdom of having any fixed roles at all: perhaps the roles and
their mutual relations should be defined for each application.
Moreover, there could be some kind of inheritance between
the roles to make their assignment easier. Indeed, the group-
management solution presented in this paper is structured so
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that it can be extended with inheritance, role hierarchies and
possibly other role-based access control [23] features. We leave
them as future work in order to focus on revocation, which is
the main topic of this paper.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the mad rush for new applications of blockchains, dis-
tributed access control seems to have been mostly an ignored
area so far. It turns out that blockchains, and public ledgers as
their generalization, are a nice abstraction for solving problems
of distributed access control, and in particular those that arise
from revocation and other negative permissions. Certificate-
based group management, in particular, provides good test
cases for understanding the requirements for public ledgers
beyond their use in cryptocurrencies. Moreover, we observe
that public-log constructions from security literature can teach
useful lessons to those designing public ledgers. As the main
result, we present a ledger-based design for distributed group-
membership management and its experimental implementa-
tion.
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